

*Administrative - Internal Use Only*

20 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Operations  
Deputy Director for Science and Technology  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence  
Community  
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence  
Officers  
Inspector General  
General Counsel  
Legislative Counsel  
Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT : Employee Perceptions

1. There is attached a memorandum of 16 October 1975 addressed to the Director entitled "Employee Perceptions". The background of the memorandum is recorded in its first paragraph.

2. The Director returned the paper to me on 18 October with the following comment:

"Most interesting - Suggest circulate to 9 a.m. meeting."

A copy is forwarded to you as suggested by the Director. As I am sure you will recognize, the penciled check marks are his.

STATINTL

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

Distribution:

Original - DDI	1 - D/DCI/IC	1 - General Counsel
1 - DDO	1 - D/DCI/NIO	1 - Legislative Counsel
1 - DDS&T	1 - IG	

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160010-8

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160010-8

16 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Employee Perceptions

Sir:

1. Recently I asked the DDA Office Directors to elicit as best they could, in a low key manner, employee perceptions of how they see the Agency, the Office, and the individual. My request was prompted by the spate of publicity, including open Senate hearings, during recent weeks. I thought you might be interested in a composite based on the Office submissions.

2. As you might expect, individual responses ranged over the entire spectrum, from morale being eroded to morale being high, from the Director giving too much information to the Director doing exactly what is needed, from the Agency having engaged in reprehensible activities to the Agency having made minor mistakes trumpeted far beyond their importance. Attempting to draw a thread of consistency, therefore, is a bit difficult, but the following does provide some insight as to what the DDA employees perceive.

A. Morale: The definition of morale presents a problem. In any number of instances an individual reflects that his morale is good, but then goes on to express concerns about the investigations, the future of the Agency and his job security, which are part of the fabric of morale. In other words, it appears that he is reluctant to admit that his morale is being affected, but indirectly there is evidence that it is. Interestingly, morale appears to be higher among the rank and file and younger personnel than it does among those who have been with the Organization a longer period of time and are in more senior positions. This latter point relates to the

- 2 -

fact there seems to be concern with the amount of "unproductive" time spent responding to congressional committees at the expense of carrying out one's duties and responsibilities, and the fact that a career of dedicated service is now open to criticism and question.

B. Reaction to Media: By and large those who have commented reacted negatively to the media indicating that in whatever form, the media is biased and politically oriented. One only hears or reads the sensational. Favorable comments or commentaries are seldom heard. ✓

C. Reaction to Investigations: Depending on the extent to which an Office is involved with the investigations, there is a high degree of sensitivity or relative indifference to what is going on. Generally, there is a reflection that a fair and responsible investigation into Agency activities is desirable. There seems to be general acceptance that further controls and specific delineations of responsibility by which the Agency might be guided would be wise. On the other hand, the reactions seem to indicate the Agency is not getting a fair shake and that Senators are using the hearings for their personal political futures and to expose the sensational in their own best interests. There is an indication that employees feel a certain amount of disillusionment, concern, and even revulsion at the revelations of the Senate hearings. There is an indication that long-term, devoted Agency employees have been somewhat betrayed. There seems to be a consistent thread that shows the younger employees are less concerned about the hearings than the long-term veterans who, over the years, were convinced of the Agency's effectiveness and goodness, and now have it thrown open to ridicule. ✓

D. Future: There is obvious concern for the uncertainty of the future of the Agency and whether or not it will continue to be able to fulfill its mission. The Agency's credibility has been damaged and to what extent it is reparable leaves some question. Recognizing that changes will be forthcoming in terms of greater control and accountability, there is concern that these might stifle creativity, imagination, ✓

innovation and growth. With more red tape, the Agency will become a more typical government agency. There are those who recognize that on the short-term there might well be a serious impact on the Agency, but on the long haul the Agency will survive and might be better for having gone through these investigations. ✓


E. Mr. Colby's Image: By and large there is high praise and respect for Mr. Colby's personal honesty, forthrightness, character, and leadership. To quote one person, Mr. Colby has "been a perfect gentleman and has shown the patience of a saint, and the endurance of an Apache Indian . . ." He is the best representative the Agency could have at this time. There is recognition that he is taking the rap for activities that happened prior to his watch. On the other hand, despite the respect for him and his patient handling of the committees, there is concern that he is providing too much information and revealing too many activities. Perhaps it is time for him to take a stronger defensive position on behalf of the Agency and its mission. ✓

F. Effects and Reaction: While a number of individuals comment that their morale is good, they now feel a sense of embarrassment and shame in admitting that they work for the Agency. There is a loss of pride related to earlier feelings that the Agency was indeed "the best" in government. There is recognition that the Agency has lost prestige and credibility and faces an atmosphere of uncertainty. Another quote--"I sense a degree of bewilderment that our proud house should prove so apparently vulnerable." Although not reported in a pointed sense, there is an indication of concern for job security in the future. By and large the hearings, their revelations, while questioned in terms of their complete authenticity, appear to have a gradually eroding effect on the conscience and morale of the employees. There was an emphatic reaction from one Office that the Sam Adams testimony was by far the most damaging and demoralizing challenge to the Agency. It was emphasized that his testimony must not go unchallenged. One final quote might be worth noting: "Since I don't really believe the Agency has ever been effectively managed, I don't find our present circumstances too unusual." ✓

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

3. In summary, employee perceptions seem to reflect a "hang in there" attitude. Rather than reflecting poor morale per se, they reflect a sense of frustration and uncertainty. It would be less than honest, however, to say that morale has not been affected. There were precious few constructive suggestions toward offsetting these difficult times except to find ways of publicizing Agency successes, but even here one recognizes the difficulty of doing so without jeopardizing sources and methods.

4. The above composite as well as all information received from the Offices has been reviewed by the Administration Management Advisory Group (ADMAG). No other distribution has been made. I leave it to your discretion whether this would be an appropriate time to circulate to the other Directorates.



John F. Blake  
Deputy Director  
for  
Administration

STATINTL

Statement  
by  
W. E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
before  
New York Council,  
Navy League of the United States  
October 20, 1975

Admiral Bergen, Mr. Mulcahy, Admiral Anderson, Admiral Moorer, Mr. Shepley, Secretary Mittendorf, ladies and gentlemen.

Not a person in this room doubts the need for a strong United States Navy.

Not a person in this room doubts the need for a strong United States Intelligence Service.

I am here to tell you we have one--the best in the world. Its technical geniuses, its dedicated clandestine operators, its objective analysts have brought whole new dimensions in precision, in scope, and in forward projections to American intelligence.

Years ago we looked to intelligence to tell us where an enemy fleet was. Today, we know not only where it is, but what it can do. And we know more--we know what kind of fleet to expect in the future. We have followed the progress of the new Russian carrier presently on sea trials since its keel was laid five years ago. We will not be startled by its appearance as part of the operational fleet as we might have been in years past.

But will we destroy this great intelligence capability? Will we have an investigation in 1980 as to why in 1975 we deprived our nation of its technical and foreign sources that provide information about the threats we will face in the years ahead?



Those threats are there:

- in the ballistic missiles cocked and aimed at us;
- in the nuclear weapons which can fall into the hands of reckless despots or paranoic terrorists;
- in the desperate and authoritarian reactions of poor and overpopulated nations to the increasing gap they see between themselves and the affluence of the developed world;
- and in the temptation of some nations to look to racist or radical rather than democratic and moderate formulas.

Good intelligence can warn us of these problems. It is not a crystal ball or an advance edition of the World Almanac of 1977. But it can identify coming problems and permit our national leaders to face them, informed and warned of the forces and factors involved.

Most importantly, with good intelligence we can not only defend against or deter such threats, we can hope to negotiate them away or resolve them before they become critical.

But is our intelligence to become mere theater? Will it be exposed in successive sensational re-runs for the amusement, or even amazement, of our people rather than being preserved and protected for the benefit of us all?

Will we have publicity or protection? Will we have sensation or safety?

Our intelligence missteps and misdeeds are indeed small in number and in substance. Against the service our intelligence has rendered the nation over the past 28 years, they are truly few and far between.

But when an operation that involved three agents is proclaimed as "massive;" when the normal detail of CIA employees to other government agencies is called "infiltration;" when an Army vulnerability study of the New York subway is ascribed to CIA "plotting" because one of our officers read the report; or when conspiracy theorists mouth CIA "complicity" in the assassination of President Kennedy despite flat denials, then the American people are understandably troubled. They can wonder whether their intelligence service is more a peril than a protector.

We are about to have our fifth rerun of the great mail-reading story. It first appeared in my testimony before CIA's oversight committees last January and February. I said we had reviewed and terminated this activity in 1973. Its second playing was in the Rockefeller Commission report. This was followed by a TV spectacular featuring Representative Abzug's indignation. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee of the House of Representatives then reviewed it. And this week, the Senate Select Committee will repeat the performance in greater detail on live TV.

I hope our citizens will derive the real message of this mail-reading affair:

- that intelligence looked at mail to and from Communist countries during the threatening days of the Cold War;
- that intelligence reviewed the activity and determined that it was improper in 1973;
- that intelligence in 1973 set out clear directives that any activities not in full compliance with the laws of the United States would stop;
- and that intelligence itself reported this matter to the bodies now investigating it.

I hope our citizens will not be misled into perceiving intelligence as a menace to our nation. I hope rather that they will see its important role as an essential--and effective--protector of our safety and democracy against the threats in the real world outside our borders.

Intelligence is not theater. It is a serious--a deadly serious business. The dedicated men and women of CIA, who serve their country in an anonymous and demanding craft, must not be made national scapegoats for the revision of our national values and consensus of the past 20 years.

We do not oppose investigation. We welcome it. But investigation must be responsible, as intelligence must be responsible.

No one in this room thinks that there should be public revelation of the Navy's war plans. The American people don't think so either. Neither do they think there should be a public revelation of the names of people who serve American intelligence in confidential, and often risky, dealings. We Americans, and we intelligence professionals, are not going to let this happen.

But damage has already been done by irresponsible exposure of true intelligence secrets. Intelligence high in the sky and deep in the ocean can be lost. Such exposures have concerned our foreign friends and caused some who wish to help us to think that the risk is too great.

Thus we Americans must call for full responsibility in our investigations of intelligence, as we do for intelligence itself. We must insist that intelligence not become theater, so that today's comedy does not become tomorrow's tragedy. We cannot stand blind and deaf in the world of the 1980s because we were hypnotized by our review of the 1950s and 60s.

Everyone in this room knows America has the best Navy in the world. We all want to keep it that way.

I want you to know that America also has the best intelligence service in the world. We must keep it that way.

SPEECH

by

LT. GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS

before

DALLAS COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS

THE CIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS

DALLAS, TEXAS

16 September 1975

Mr. Cooper, General West, General Torrey...

...and so many friends that I have seen here today. You know, the usual thing is to say is that "it's an honor and a privilege to be able to talk to you today," well really it is an extraordinary pleasure -- I have seen here people I haven't seen for a long time, that I have known for many years -- Assistant Secretary Rubottom, General Harkins, General Powell, Colonels McGinnis and Lucas, with whom I have worked and a great many other people. General Torrey and I were with the Brazilians in Italy and he knew that President of Brazil also. So I feel myself very fortunate to be here today and to have this opportunity to talk to you a little bit about intelligence and world affairs.

Particularly because we live, as you know, in a much smaller world than that in which any of our predecessors ever lived. We no longer live in the world where James Madison said that he hadn't heard from his Minister in Spain for two years and if he didn't hear from him within the next year he was going to send someone to find out what was going on in Spain. We live in a world of instant communications, as you know, where whatever happens requires decisions and actions by our leaders

almost immediately. You no longer have the kind of fall-back in time that we've had right up to and including World War II when we had two oceans to protect us and give us time; when we had powerful allies; the world was not a bi-polarized or a tri-polarized world; there were a number of great powers in the world.

But today we live in quite a different world--in a world where instantaneous decisions are required of our leaders. And so, intelligence is more vital--it has always been vital, it's been overwhelmingly vital--but it is more vital today than at any time that I know of in the past of human history. So, what is intelligence? Well, intelligence is information concerning foreign countries, their policies, their armed forces, their economies, their financial policies, their research and development, and all the other activities they have that can in some way impact upon us or upon our future. I would say if one asked me what are the great questions that lie before American intelligence today, they can be summed up in about four major items: who will be in control of the Soviet Union five years from today; what will be their feelings towards us; what will be their general policies towards us and towards the rest of the world; what is there in Soviet

research and development today that will be of importance to us in the years ahead? And the same questions are true for China. But in addition to the old kinds of intelligence which were basically military intelligence, we have all kinds of economic intelligence problems today that impact upon us to a degree that has not occurred in the past. There are billions of petrodollars, there are Eurodollars wandering around the world. What foreign powers do with those is of enormous impact upon us in the way we live, in the way we do business and everything else. This has not been the case before. We must get this information to those who make decisions in the United States, and we must get it quickly, because if you don't get intelligence in timely fashion to those who have to make the decisions, it isn't intelligence, it's history. And it's not of any particular use.

Now intelligence is knowledge and knowledge is power. People have always thought in the past of intelligence as being merely a power to make war or a power to threaten or a power to overawe someone. The world has changed; intelligence is power in another sense. It is a power for peace. You ask me how is it a power for peace? Well



-4-

in 1953 I went with General Eisenhower to the conference in Geneva where he proposed the "open skies" to the Soviet Union, namely that we could overfly them and they could overfly us and check whether we were living up to whatever commitments we took to one another. The Soviets rejected this as a violation of their sovereignty. As a matter of fact, a rather amusing incident occurred and this was in Geneva in the League of Nations Building. General Eisenhower said he wished that God would give him some means of convincing them of our sincerity. And as he said that, there was a loud clap of thunder and every light in the building went out. Well, I think the Soviets are still trying to figure out how we did it.

But the reason why we need intelligence is quite frankly related to power. Foreign nations have not had the capability against the United States that the Soviet Union has today since Valley Forge--since we became an independent nation. In the past the United States has always been unreachable and unbeatable. We have another country in the world with a larger population than we have, with larger number of arms in any field that you want to examine with the possible exception of missiles on which there has been an agreement. They have an ability to reach us which no nation has had in the past. Today the Soviet Union has that power. Tomorrow China will

have it. And again we have the fact that we need to know what is going to happen, not just militarily but economically. Now good intelligence has made it possible for us to make certain agreements limiting strategic weapons with the Soviet Union. But we have been able to make them only because, through good intelligence, we have the means of verifying whether they are living up to those agreements or not. And the fact that they know we can verify it nudges them in the direction of not trying to cheat too blatantly, because they know that we will know if they are cheating in any considerable degree.

One of the problems with intelligence is: when you have a failure it is trumpeted all over the world; when you have a success it is very difficult to talk about because if you talk about it people will know what you know and how you know it and if somebody knows that somebody is looking through the window they are going to pull down the blinds and turn off the light.

But intelligence is a power for peace. In my experience on a number of occasions we have brought countries together that were on the edge of war. One of them thought the other was going to attack them. We have been able through good intelligence to convince Country A that it was not going to be

-6-

attacked by Country B. Through intelligence and liaison contacts we have been able to bring, sometimes, the heads of the intelligence services of these countries together. Now I can't tell you what countries they are or we couldn't do it again. But we have done this on a number of occasions. And so intelligence is a power for peace also. We have been able to reassure people that so and so is not going to jump you.

Now this is not spectacular and it makes no headlines. President Kennedy once told us that the fate of intelligence was to be pilloried for your mistakes, which become well known, and condemned to have your successes passed over in silence.

And so some of these ideas of bringing out estimates where we made a wrong guess and we don't have a crystal ball-- we do our best--gives you a totally one-sided picture of where we failed. As a matter of fact, the particular instance they're talking about now in the Middle East, we made the post-mortem, we were the ones who analyzed the causes of our failure long before there was any investigation of it. And we turned that in to the President and the Government--of where we felt we had failed to interpret some of these things correctly. So this is held up today as a proof we failed. Well, when we succeed we don't hold post-mortems so we haven't got any piece of paper that can be held up in the same way. And,

in fact, one of the problems is: if you point up your successes you know how these successes were achieved and it is easy for those who look into these matters to see how it was we found out and we won't be able to do it any more.

Now these nations have these capabilities that can affect our daily lives in every way. We need scientific and technological intelligence, not just to defend ourselves but to make sure we don't fall back of other countries. I don't have to tell you that every country in the world is keeping a close watch on American technology. American technology has been the marvel of the world--they are all trying to find out how it is that we do some of the things that we do. And if we fail to do it in the other direction we will be failing the American people. We have the duty not to let our nation fall behind in this area also.

One of the great questions that is before us is that we see the Soviet Union, which has developed power in every field. We see them modernizing their missiles, putting multiple independent re-entry vehicles on the various missiles that they have had up to now. We see them deploying four new types of missiles, third generation missiles. We see them building larger submarines with more capabilities for launching missiles. We see them building new modern aircraft with

-8-

capabilities against the United States. We see them adding tanks to every Soviet motorized rifle division around the world. We see them improving the training of their forces, the logistics of their forces, and the over-all capabilities of their forces. And this has gone far beyond what they require for defense or deterrence, which leaves us with the great question of what do they plan to do with this, how do they plan to use these forces which they have that are far beyond what is required for defense. And these will vitally affect the lives of the American people; these will vitally affect the decisions that our nation will have to make. Now we all hope that détente works out and it does result in a lessening of tensions, but we have to be realists. We have to live in the real world. They speak of détente, but we see this tremendous uninterrupted continuing effort in every field of their armed forces and scientific research. We hope for détente.

But not long ago I was in Europe and a friend of mine in one of the European intelligence services told me a story about two young Americans who went to Moscow and they were being taken around by a young Soviet. They were taken to various sight-seeing places and finally he took them to the zoo where he showed them all these animals and they came to this cage--a very large

cage--in which there was a very large Russian bear and he had teeth this long and claws that long. In the same cage was a rather worried-looking lamb but he appeared to be in good shape. One of the young Americans said to the young Russian, "Why do you put those two in the same cage? It's an odd couple to put in the same cage." And the young Russian said, "Oh, this is to prove that peaceful coexistence is possible." The young American said, "Well, I must admit it's pretty impressive." And his buddy said, "It's quite convincing." The young Russian looked around and seeing no one said, "Of course, you understand, every morning we have to put in a new lamb."

So, we have to make sure that we aren't the lambs or that we don't run out of lambs.

So we have the problem before us in which we have a continuing responsibility to our Government of what use will they make of this. We try to answer. I can't tell you we have a crystal ball that can tell exactly what they are going to do. We can't. Sometimes we're wrong; sometimes we're right. We do our best.

How do we collect this intelligence? Well, we collect it in a number of ways. First of all we collect it overtly through the U.S. embassies, through the publications in the press, through the radio broadcasts put out by the various broadcasting systems of the various nations, through the newspapers. Through many, many ways, and it is quite

-10-

astonishing if you read these regularly how much you can find out. If you read the Minsk-Pravda long enough you can find out who's going to the top of the Byelorussian Republic long before it happens. So we collect these; we collect them technologically. I am not going to go into the details of the technological system. I am sure most of them are known to you in a general way. They are immensely sophisticated systems, immensely expensive systems; but they have put us in a position where we no longer can have, as we had in the early Sixties, a debate about a missile gap. That is no longer possible. Technical intelligence is good enough today that we can tell within a few missiles what the relationship of power in this particular area is.

We collect, as I say, technically, and then we collect with human sources through espionage. Now there is a great effort to make us believe that this is un-American, that the Founding Fathers wouldn't have liked it, and everything else. In 1947, when the Congress created the Central Intelligence Agency, they knew it was going to conduct espionage. This does not come as any great surprise to them. In fact, the charter under which we operated says, "...and will do such other things as the National Security Council may prescribe."

They didn't want to get into the details of what they wanted us to do. And frankly when all these investigations are over I don't think we'll have guidelines that will be much more precise than that because it is very difficult to establish guidelines in that sort of thing.

America has traditionally dismantled its intelligence apparatus after all its wars. This time it was a little longer because we had the Korean War and the Vietnam War, but the dismantlers are there now trying to dismantle our intelligence apparatus. If we go back in time we find Mr. Stimson when he was Secretary of State in the early 1930's. They brought him an intercepted de-coded message of another nation and he was shocked. He said, "Oh, gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail." Well eight years later as Secretary of the Army he couldn't get enough "other gentlemen's mail" to read. And this kind of psychology--not particularly Mr. Stimson--but this kind of psychology led us to what happened at Pearl Harbor. After Pearl Harbor when we had the last great intelligence investigation we found that we had all the pieces that would have told us what was going to happen but everybody was squirreling away his own little piece and not telling anybody else about it. And this is one of the



-12-

reasons that led to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency so that there would be a central place where all this would come together. I'll get back a minute to that human source collection.

You know, various technologies will get you all sorts of wonderful things, but they won't tell you what's inside a man's head. In the particular Middle Eastern war we saw and knew what the forces were in presence. We did not have human access into the decision process of "go" or "no-go" and this is why you need human sources. Sometimes if you get a human source you can save hundreds of millions of dollars that would be required to collect the technical intelligence that you would have to collect by other means if you did not have the human source. The human source is vital in pushing things in a direction favorable to the interests of the United States. You don't have to have a spy, you just have to have a relationship with someone to whom you have explained the United States' purposes, who is favorably disposed to the United States. And very often he can move things in a direction favorable to our interests, favorable to peace, and favorable to the preservation of freedom. Now one of the great things that breeds hostility is ignorance. People tend to always fear what they don't know.

Not long ago--two years ago, Mr. Brezhnev was here and he was at the White House and President Nixon introduced Mr. Colby, our Director, to Mr. Brezhnev. He said, "This is Mr. Colby who is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency." And Brezhnev said, "Is he a dangerous man?" The President said, "No, he believes in peace." Mr. Colby said to Mr. Brezhnev a great truth that Mr. Brezhnev did not acknowledge. He said, "Mr. General Secretary, the more we know about one another, the safer we both are." If we know about them and they know about us and they have a far more developed intelligence service than we do--I don't know whether they have any better intelligence, I doubt it--but they have a lot more people working at it. In fact, they have more people working at neutralizing us than there are in our whole service.

But we face also another problem which are the new forms of war. We always think of war in the old sense of divisions coming across borders and everything else. Two thousand five hundred years ago a Chinese author by the name of Sun Tzu wrote a book called The Art of War. This may be 25 centuries old, but it is as up-to-date as this morning's newspaper. He describes how you go about undoing your enemies and I would simply like to read a direct quotation from what he said, and

-14-

if it sounds familiar to you, it sounds familiar to me. He said, "The most consummate art is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them. The direct method of war is necessary only on the battlefield; but only the indirect method will obtain true victory and consolidate it." And now he goes ahead to tell you how you undue your enemies without having to fight them. "Denigrate everything that is good in your opponent's country. Involve the leaders in criminal enterprises and deliver them up to the scorn of their fellow countrymen. Undermine them in every way you can. Use the the most vile and execrable of individuals. Cause trouble by every means within their government. Spread discord and quarrels in the opposing nation. Agitate the young against the old. Destroy all their means, all of their weapons and above all the discipline of their armed forces. Cover with ridicule their traditions and values. Be generous in your offers of rewards to obtain information and accomplices. Put secret agents everywhere. Never stint on money or promises; you will reap rich rewards. The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles; the supreme excellence is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them." Now this is the new form of war; this is combined

with terrorism. We have international terrorism acting all over the world today on a scale that is similar to the organization of a nation; and if we are to preserve ourselves from that terrorism we've got to have intelligence against that kind of a terrorist movement. Now a terrorist movement does not have a physical area that it operates like a country. You have to get human sources into it if you are going to find out what happens.

Now we have people in our country today who would have us believe that intelligence is shady, un-American, unworthy, that the Founding Fathers wouldn't have liked it--it's all very well for those dirty old European countries to do it, but we fine, pure Americans can't stoop to this sort of thing. Well, that is a highly unrealistic and a highly false attitude in regard to American history. We have people in our country today who believe that if we've done some things that were questionable or done some things that perhaps we should not have done, that we can be purified through publicity of them.

I had a head of a European service say to me, "You know, I don't understand why all Americans aren't Catholics." I said, "What do you mean?" "Well," he said, "it's the only

religion that affords confession for everybody." And then he paused and he said, "But I suppose it's the fact that it's private that's the drawback." So we have this psychology that we must confess all of our sins to everybody, beating our breasts as though we had done these horrible things.

Well, the United States, I think, can stand on its record. We've fought two great wars in this century. We defeated our enemies and I don't think in all human history any victorious nation ever did for the defeated nations what we did for those we defeated. We picked them out of the ashes of disaster and I believe we are the only nation in history ever to finance its competitors back into competition. So we may have had some shortcomings here and there, but I think as a nation we can be proud of our record. And what I say as a nation I say for the Central Intelligence Agency.

I can't tell you that in the 50,000 or 60,000 people that have passed through this agency in the last 25 years that we haven't had some bad apples, that we haven't had some people who have done things they probably shouldn't have done. What great corporation with 50,-60,000 people doesn't have some things go on in the corporation that they wouldn't approve of. But

-17-

I would submit that if you take our record and take a town of 60,- or 70,000 people--or a corresponding number of people,--we wouldn't look that bad. I think if you submitted any other agency of the U.S. Government to the kind of scrutiny we've been submitted to the last two or three years that we wouldn't look very bad. I am not saying we haven't done things that are wrong; we probably have at one time or another. But they are few and far between and most of them came to light as a result of our own investigation not as a result of someone finding them out as against us.

You hear a lot about assassinations. I'm not going to get into the assassinations business today since the Congressional report is going to come out shortly. But you have to go back to the state of mind in which people were. Not long ago we had some people out to the CIA--perhaps some of the most vocal against us now--and one of our people said to one of them, "You know, if anybody could have killed Hitler in '43 or '44, they would probably have been the first joint recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Victoria Cross." And one of our lawmakers said, "Oh, but if you could have killed him in '37 or '38 think how many lives you would have saved." We were at peace with Germany in '37 and '38. And, yet, here is one of the sanctimonious voices inveighing against us

-18-

telling us what a great thing it would have been if we could have done it then.

You hear about the drugs--the drug test--I think the President spoke for all of us when he said what a terrible thing it was that this man committed suicide after the drugs had been experimented on him. But I think you have to go back to the environment of that time. This was the end of the Korean War. For the first time in American history we saw American soldiers not only refusing to come home, but denouncing their own country. More frightening still, we saw people like Cardinal Mindzenty who had resisted every torture, every imprisonment and every pressure of the Nazis, who had resisted the worse the Nazis could do, coming before us haggard, hollow-eyed to confess everything his Communist captors wanted him to confess. The American people by and large believed that this was being done with mind-bending drugs that could be used against our diplomats, or against our armed forces, that we should look into this, that we should find out how they were used or what could be done about them. And this research was not confined to the CIA or the armed forces. Many of the important institutions of learning in the United States--the National Institutes of Health and others were engaged in this research. I am not telling you that it was right that

-19-

the drugs were experimented on the man, but I am just putting the thing a little bit in the context of the time. Now, today we have all this story about toxins that have been discovered. Well, first of all, the toxins have been there for 25 years and nobody knew about it--we found them ourselves without anybody pushing us to find them, by the simple process of going over our own place and we found these things and we reported them to the Congress. They didn't discover them; we found them. They had been stored there for years. Well, perhaps these were not approved, but the other side had been using these things to kill people in Germany and elsewhere. Again there was the question of knowing what the capabilities were, how you could counter them and what you could have to retaliate if they were used on you. And this was the source and stimulation of that particular research. So, at that time the idea was to have a capability.

The thing happened so long ago that a whole generation of people grew up who did not know that these things were there. We did not know until very carefully we went over our own place; we found them, and when we found them we duly reported them.

Of course, one of the facts that you don't get is that they haven't been used.



- 20 -

The United States had committed itself, prior to World War II, not to use poison gas. But the United States during World War II had large stores of poison gas in case the use of it was forced upon us.

We feel that these investigations can be healthy providing they are conducted in a responsible and positive fashion; providing they are not used as TV theatricals, or to advance anybody's personal ambitions. We are perfectly willing to be responsive to whatever guidance the Congress gives us in this area. We just hope that whatever guidelines they give us contain some mechanism for change, because the perception of the American people, what they are willing to accept, changes with the passage of time.

In 1935 you could have run a segregated school; in 1975 you can't. In 1925, if you tried to run anything but a segregated school you would have been in serious trouble. So, we are perfectly willing--we understand that we must operate within the standards approved by the American people and we are perfectly willing to do so. But we just hope that as the perception of the American people changes, that these guidelines will provide for some means of changing.

Now, right now, we are being attacked and pilloried for our alleged sins of commission. What concerns me is that in 1990 one of Mr. Colby's successors may be before an investigator who will be saying to him, "You mean, you didn't do this? You mean you weren't watching that? You mean you failed to keep track of this?" So one has to take a somewhat longer view of many of these things.

But we have today a deliberate attempt to blind our own country, to convince us that we are wrong. If they want to correct us this is easy to do. Most nations have investigations into their intelligence services, but they don't do it, so to speak, in a goldfish bowl. They appoint a committee that goes about the job quietly and without making a television theatrical or a grand national spectacle out of it.

You know, a foreigner once said to me, "I used to think the Flagellantes and Penitentes were two small sects in Arizona and New Mexico. Now I see vast colonies of them all over the eastern and western seaboard."

Today we have an attempt in this country to create a new racism, a new caste of untouchables: people who work in intelligence, who are unfit for contact with decent citizens, who are unfit for further employment after they leave

- 22 -

intelligence. These things can do great damage to Americans who have helped us. Today we see American corporations who have helped us to establish our people abroad being pilloried as though they had done something shameful. What do they expect us to do? Send people abroad with a sign around their necks saying, "I am a CIA agent." This is something that is done by every country in the world. But we have these Pharisees who will tell you, "Oh, this is all right for those dirty British, French, and Russians; but we pure Americans don't stoop to this sort of thing." They tell you about the Founding Fathers. Well, in this bicentennial year I have done a little research on the Founding Fathers and come up with some rather interesting items.

George Washington organized three separate kidnap attempts to get hold of Benedict Arnold. And you know what he was going to do with him when he got him. George Washington organized a kidnap attempt on George III's son, Prince William of Britain, who was in New York in 1782. We have Benjamin Franklin. Benjamin Franklin, for three years before the Revolution started, from 1772 to 1775, was the Assistant Postmaster of British North America. You know what he was doing? Opening the British mail and reading it. They caught him and he was

fired. Then he went to Paris and at his request the French built a printing press for him. You know what he printed on that press? British currency, British passports, British documentation.

We are told that the Founding Fathers wanted the people to know everything. Well let me just quote you from a letter that George Washington wrote to his chief of intelligence in New Jersey Colonel Elias Dayton. This is what he said: "The need for procuring good intelligence is so obvious that I need add nothing further about this. All that remains is for me to tell you that these matters must be kept as secret as possible; for the lack of secrecy, these enterprises, no matter how well planned or how promising the outlook, generally fail. I am, Sir, your obedient servant. George Washington"

You can say that's a long time ago. Let's come down to President Harry Truman. President Harry Truman in 1956 had this to say: "It matters not to the United States whether its secrets become known through publication in the newspapers or the actions of spies. The damage to the United States is exactly the same in both cases. And I for one," said Mr. Truman, "do not believe that the best interests of our country are served by going on the principle that everybody has a right to know everything about our secrets." And I think this is a truism that the American people will accept.

- 24

In the reductions we have had in intelligence we need help from our foreign friends. Our foreign friends are aghast at what's going on. There is no precedent for this. We are now engaged in a series of public investigations to determine whether any great nation can operate its secret intelligence service, so to speak, in a goldfish bowl. Now we may be able to, because we are a very unusual people; but if we do it's going to be just like going to the moon. We'll be the only ones who ever succeeded in doing it. We need their help. How do we get their help when they live in eternal fear that they are going to see their names in the newspapers in the United States or they are going to hear their names broadcast, or their names are going to be cited in some hearing. And this is very difficult for us because we need their help. Individuals who have been assisting us live in the same fear. .

Now I would like to tell you that has done us colossal harm. Fortunately it hasn't. But the one thing we will never know is: who are the people who would have come forward to help us and who did not come forward as a result of what is going on in the United States today. This we will never know. What Penkovsky was ready to come forward to help us, to shed light. We don't know. We will not know. The security of the United States and its survival is far too precious to be the vehicle for anybody's political ambitions.

We hear about rights. Who thinks of the rights of the people who work in intelligence who are covered with a torrent of innuendo? We had a seven-column headline that Mr. Butterfield was a CIA infiltrator into the White House. Several days later we had a one-column headline saying that he wasn't.

I am not an old CIA man. I came there for the first time three years ago. All I can tell you is that the people that work in CIA are dedicated American citizens who live by the same standards as everybody else. They are not a breed unto themselves; they are a cross-cut of the United States. They know what the American people will accept and what the American people will not accept. They have no way of fighting back against this torrent of innuendo and slander.

I have faith in the American people. The American people can't be easily fooled. Someone asked me the other day whether, when these investigations are over, we expect to be able to recover the confidence of the American people. I said I was not conscious we had lost it. Today we have four times as many applicants to work at the CIA as we did before this whole business started, and they are the young people coming out of the universities. Okay, the economy may be some part of that; but not four times. The number of people withdrawing their applications for working there is less than at any time in the past.

- 26 -

We are condemned whether we like it or not, and not through our own choice, to fight on the silent battlefield of intelligence. If we don't fight there we will lose the world by default. Those who fight us are fighting with brass knuckles. Some people may think we can repel them with Marquis of Queensbury rules; I doubt it very much. We will not be dismayed; we will not be deterred from what we must do by those who rummage through the garbage pails of history for things that happened 25 years ago. This is not the issue before the American people. The issue before the American people is: are we going to have an effective intelligence service to protect this nation in the years ahead or are we going to destroy that intelligence service and wait like the lamb for the day when we have to choose between annihilation or subjection.

I don't think the American people are going to put up with that. The American people react differently from most other people. The head of a foreign service again told me a story about a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an American who were captured by the cannibals on the desert island in the Pacific and he announced to them that they were going to be eaten for lunch the next day. But he was going to give them each one wish, not including setting them free. He said to the Frenchman, "What do you want?" The Frenchman said, "Well, if I'm going to be executed tomorrow, I would just as

soon spend the remaining time with that beautiful cannibal girl over there." So they said, "Okay," and they untied him and he and the cannibal girl went off in the woods. Then they said to the Englishman, "What do you want?" The Englishman said, "I want a pen and paper." And they said, "What do you want a pen and paper for?" He said, "I want to write a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, to protest against the unfair, unsporting, and unjust attitude you have adopted towards us." So they untied the Englishman, they gave him a pen and paper and gave him a hut where he could write. Then they said to the American, "What do you want?" The American said, "I want to be led into the middle of the square and I want to be made to kneel down and I want the biggest cannibal here to kick me in the rear end." So the chief said, "That's an odd request, but the Americans are odd people and I promised, so okay." So they led the American in and they made him kneel down and the biggest cannibal gave him a tremendous kick, knocked him for a loop. The American had been hiding a submachine gun under his clothes and at this point he took out the submachine gun and cut down the cannibals and the rest fled. The Frenchman, hearing the gunfire, came out of the woods; the Englishman, hearing the gunfire, came out of his hut; and they looked at the American and they said, "You mean you had that



-28-

submachine gun the whole time?" He said, "Sure." They said, "Why didn't you use it before now?" The American looked at them and very earnestly he said, "It wasn't until they kicked me in the rear end that I had any moral justification for it."

The motto of our organization is: "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Perhaps we ought to change this slightly: "You must know the truth for only the truth will keep you free." And steadfastly and vigilantly and within the law we will continue to seek the truth that will keep this country freedom's last best hope. For if we drop the torch of human freedom, there is no one else around to pick it up and night will fall for an incalculable time on human freedom. Many of those who attack us today were very upset when President Thieu of South Vietnam used to suspend one of the five opposition newspapers. Now thanks in no small part to their efforts, this problem is no longer with us. There are no opposition newspapers in South Vietnam any more. And all Vietnamese newspapermen who were practicing their profession are writing what their communist masters tell them to write.

I said before: the real issue before us is "Will we have an effective intelligence service?" as we enter the last years

of this century. And I trust the American people. I think we will. The American people understand what is at stake. They are not always immediate in their judgments, but every indication that we have is that the American society which has given to a higher percentage of its people more of the good things of life than any other system that man has evolved since we came out of the caves, will not stand supinely by and allow itself to be destroyed. Someone once said, "A society that will not defend itself will not survive and will not deserve to survive." We will survive.

Thank you very much.

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160010-8

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP85-00759R000100160010-8